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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DALE M. KESSIMAKIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 15387 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was a proceeding by a divorced husband, defendant-
appellant, to modify the provisions of a divorce decree 
entered on August 28, 1974; and a proceeding by the divorced 
wife to obtain judgment for unpaid alimony and support 
money. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court refused to modify the decree, found the 
husband in contempt, and entered judgment against him for 
$16,391.40 for past due alimony, support money, mortgage 
payments, unpaid debts, and attorney's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the dis-
trict court entered on May 12, 1977, and remand to that 
court with directions to modify the decree by fixing a 
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reasonable time within which plaintiff may be permitted to 
pay off the judgment for arrearages, and suspending the 
payment of alimony and support money during the payout 
period. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 22, 1974, respondent, Betty L. Kessimakis, 
commenced this action against Dale M. Kessimakis, by filing 
a complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake County, and 
having Dale sign an entry of appearance and waiver, prepare: 
by Betty's attorney, in which he waived the time to answer 
or otherwise plead and consented to the entry of his defaul· 
and judgment in accordance with the demand of the complaint 
(R 7). On May 9, 1974, an amended complaint was filed (Rf 
12), and Dale signed a like entry of appearance and waiver 
with respect to the amended complaint (R 13). 
The case was heard as a default matter on August 2, 
1974, at which time Betty testified as to the grounds fur 
divorce, the property of the parties and Dale's income. s: 
testified that the parties owned a home in which they had' 
equity of $30,000, the home being worth approximately 
$50,000, with a mortgage balance of $20,000; that Dale h~ 
an earning capacity of from $600 to $3,000 per month; ili~ 
for the past few months he had been earning $400 to $800 
per week; that the home cost $4 7, 000 to $50,000; that Bet:: 
- 2 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had put up $15,000 of the purchase price; that Dale's father 
had put up from $6,000 to $10,000, and that friends did much 
of the work on the house. She also testified that Dale had 
a share, "not much," in a family corporation with his father 
and brother (transcript of August 2, 1974). 
On August 28, 1974, the court entered its decree of 
divorce (R 19-21). The decree granted a divorce to Betty, 
awarded her the custody of the three minor children, subject 
to reasonable visitation, $100 per month for each of the 
minor children's support and maintenance, and $200 per month 
as alimony. The decree also required Dale to pay all debts 
and obligations incurred by the parties during the course of 
the marriage, and a $500 attorney's fee. 
In dividing the property of the parties, the court 
awarded Betty the entire equity in the residence (but ordered 
Dale to pay the mortgage on it), all of the furniture, con-
tents and appliances in the residence! one-half of Dale's 
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., the parties' only auto-
mobile, and her personal effects, clothing, and items of 
personal property then in her possession. The defendant was 
awarded his personal clothing and effects, one-half of his 
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., and the personalty in 
his possession. 
In February 1975, Dale filed a motion to set aside the 
default divorce on various grounds (R 24-25) which was denied 
- 3 -
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by Honorable Bryant H. Croft on March 21, 1975 (R 103). 
Formal orders denying the motion were entered on March 26 , 
1975, and April 3, 1975 (R 104, 105). 
Dale Kessimakis then appealed to this court from the 
order denying the motion to set aside the default and the 
judgment (R 108). This court affirmed the trial court on 
the ground that the motion to set aside the default judgme: 
was not timely and an abuse of discretion had not been 
shown. In its opinion the court noted: 
The principal complaint made by the defendant is that 
the court imposed upon him a financial burden with 
which he is unable to comply, and that the plaintiff 
did not testify truthfully to his wealth and earnings. 
If such be a fact, he is not helpless. He may petitic 
the trial court for a modification of the terms of ~ 
decree, if there is a change in circumstances. While 
his actual earnings now may be the same as they were 
the time of the divorce proceeding, neither party can 
at this late date dispute the findings made by the 
court at the hearing. If plaintiff's earnings and 
wealth are now less than what the court found them to 
be, there is a change of circumstances which would 
justify a consideration by the court for need to modif. 
the original decree. (R 140). 
When the case was remitted to the district court, the 
husband filed a motion to modify the divorce decree anda 
petition for an order to show cause to modify the divorce 
decree (R 144, 181-182), and on August 9, 1976, the court 
entered an order to show cause based upon the husband's 
motion and petition (R 188-189). At about the same time, 
d · wJ.· th an order to show cause of her the wife was procee J.ng 
own: why the defendant should not be held in contempt and 
- 4 -
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amounts unpaid under the original decree reduced to judg-
ment (R 194-197). 
The matters were heard by Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
Jr., on May 3, 1977, at which time both the husband and 
wife testified (transcript of May 3, 1977). 
Dale Kessimakis's evidence showed that he is 39 years 
old (Tr 8), that he and Betty built a home in the spring of 
1972 on land donated by Dale's father, which was worth 
approximately $10,000 to $12,000. In addition Dale's father 
put up $9,000 in cash and Betty contributed $15,000 of her 
own (Tr 9). The couple borrowed additional funds from 
Walker Bank to finance the home; Dale and his friends worked 
on the house without charge; and a number of items were 
provided by his friends at low cost (Tr 10) • 
At the time, Dale was making $110 per week net, and to 
increase his earnings he worked for a friend setting tile 
and raised quail for marketing (Tr 11). In the 1972-1973 
period, he earned approximately $1,000 to $2,000 per month 
selling quail one of the years, and approximately $1,000 per 
month the other year. In raising the quail he paid only for 
the feed, his father furnishing the lights and gas. 
The home was valued in ~iay 1974 at $65,000, and was 
furnished (Tr 12). Walker Bank Company held two mortgages 
on the home, one for $15,000 and one for $6,000. The other 
assets were his quail, a 1969 Oldsmobile worth $1,000 to 
- 5 -
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$1,200, furniture worth approximately $3,000 to $5,000, an: 
a piano. He did not own any stock in Kessimakis Produce 
(Tr 13). 
Just prior to the divorce, Dale had approximately 200! 
quail, one large brooder and a half dozen smaller ones, anc 
one large incubator and one small one. The quail were 
"qirtonia" quail, which reached maturity in six to eight 
weeks. At the time of divorce Betty wanted $200 alimony, 
$100 support money for each of the three children, and the 
mortgage payment of approximately $318 (Tr 14) a total of 
more than $800 per month. In addition, Dale was ordered t 
pay all obligations. 
He testified that he gave Betty his entire amountof 
his paychecks in 1974 (Tr 15) and gave her money up until 
January 1975 in cash (Tr 16). Whenever he had extra monei 
or received any from his father, he gave it to Betty. In 
1974 his father gave him $1,000 to $2,000. In these tram 
actions he would simply ask his father if he could borro11 
some money and his father would give it to him. He did D( 
give receipts to his father or get them from Betty. In 
January 1975, he had about 2000 quail left (Tr 17) 1 one 
brooder worth about $50, and one incubator worth about : 
By that time he had sold just about everything he could' 
did not have any breeding stock left. During 1974 heal' 
sold all of his falconry equipment, most of his quail~ 
- 6 -
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some cages, paintings, prints, his boa constrictors and 
pythons, leaving him virtually nothing in the way of tan-
gible assets. 
In 1975 he had no gainful employment other than with 
his father's company. His father gave him money (Tr 18) in 
the amount of about $2,000 per year over and above what he 
earned at the company. He kept records of payments to 
Betty and the children in a small book (Exhibit 2-D, Tr 19), 
and most of the money given to the children came from his 
father. The record he kept included produce and food brought 
from the market, plus his salary (Tr 21). 
Since 1975, Dale has not had any employment other than 
working for his father (Tr 24). He is now earning $190 per 
week, net, or $823 per month. He had earned $125 per week 
when the divorce began. The parties daughter, Cindy, had 
been living with Dale for about six months prior to the 
hearing (Tr 25) . 
From the date of the decree, Dale paid Betty in cash, 
giving her the amount of his paycheck, plus extra money 
received from his father, plus the income from items sold. 
He continued to do this until the end of January 1975, a six 
month period (Tr 28). During 1974 he received $1,000 to 
$2,000, and perhaps more, in gifts from his father. This 
money he gave to the children and to Betty (Tr 31) • In 
1974, besides the income from his produce job, he sold some 
- 7 -
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quail and worked on a job with a friend. At the time of th, 
hearing he was working for his father in the produce busine, 
He can't raise quail at this time because he does not have 
breeders and does not have the funds to obtain any. He has 
one falcon left but does not raise any other birds (Tr 32), 
Dale does not own any interest in the produce corpor-
ation and has not acted as an officer or director (Tr 34). 
His father, who is 89 years old and runs the business, has 
indicated that when he dies he may leave the business to 
Dale and his brother (Tr 36). Dale had not paid any part c 
the $500 awarded as attorneys fees, and had not paid the 
Master charge, but gave Betty money with which she could 
have paid it. He did pay the one doctor bill (Tr 37, 38). 
For the years 1974 and 1975, his income tax returns 
were prepared by a certified public accountant and were 
filed with the Internal Revenue Service (Tr 39). About a 
year ago he had received from the company over and above h 
salary, the amount of $1,500 to $1,700, but he did not 
understand the difference between a "dividend" and a "bonu 
(Tr 40). This was the only extra money he had received fr 
the business. Other amounts he received from his fath~ 
came from his father's pocket. He does not own a car ori 
stock and does not presently have any substantial expense' 
because he lives at his father's place (Tr 41-42) · 
- 8 -
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The income tax returns prepared and filed by the certi-
fied public accountant, William J. Jackson, Jr. (R 176-177) 
show that Dale's adjusted gross income for 1974 was $7,995.01, 
and for 1975 was $9,365.55. 
Betty Kessimakis testified that Dale had not given her 
any money from the time of the decree until the end of 
January 1975, that she lived on money she had in the bank 
then sold furniture then went on welfare. 
In 1976, Betty sold the home awarded to her by the 
decree and received net proceeds of $38,000 (Tr 48). She 
used $19,000 of this for a down payment on a new home, paid 
$1,300 on attorneys fees, used some for living expenses, is 
buying furniture, and has no cash left (Tr 49). 
She stated that as of November 1976, Dale began paying 
her $350 per month, and this was received for the months 
October 1976 through April 1977, but nothing else had been 
paid since the date of the decree. She testified that the 
total amount owing to her by Dale is $15,391.40 (Tr 46). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The trial court's refusal to modify the divorce decree 
was erroneous and ineauitable. 
The Utah statute, and cases from almost everywhere, 
consider divorce proceedings to be equitable in nature; but 
- 9 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
occasionally a case slips through the cracks of the equi-
table basket and a husband is pointed toward lifelong fief-
dom. Unless this court intercedes, this is such a case. 
The governing Utah statute, 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotatec 
1953 1 provides: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property and 
parties 1 and the maintenance of the parties and child-
ren, as may be equitable. The court shall have contir.-
uing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or 
new orders with respect to the support and maintenancE 
of the parties 1 the custody of the children and their 
support and maintenance, or the distribution of the 
property as shall be reasonable and necessary* * *. 
In this case there was nothing equitable about the 
original decree. With a stroke of the pen--by signing an 
entry of appearance and waiver--the husband in effect gave 
his wife virtually everything he had. In a default proceec 
ing she was awarded the home, the equity in which was wortf 
nearly $40,000, and he was ordered to make the mortgage 
payments of more then $300 a month on that home; she was 
given one-half of what business interest he had; she was 
given the parties' only automobile; she was given other 
personal property; and she was awarded $200 per month alir: 
and $300 per month for the support and maintenance of the 
three children. The husband was awarded his personal clof 
ing and effects, such personal property as he might haW~ 
his possession, and all of the parties' obligations. 
But there was nothing he could do about that. He hac 
signed his life away and had awakened too late. 
- 10 -
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court Act provides for the appointment of counsel for child-
ren who are not represented, but makes no like provision for 
unwary husbands. 
Appellant recognizes that it is now too late to chal-
lenge the original decree; but in a proceeding for modifica-
tion of that decree, the court cannot be unmindful of obvious 
inequities in the original decree. Movever, it is at least 
arguable that substantial changes in circumstance need not 
be shown in order to obtain modification of a divorce decree. 
Prior to its amendment in 1969, 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953 read as 
follows: 
When a decree of divorce is made the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property, and 
parties, and the maintenance of the parties and child-
ren as may be equitable; provided, that if any of the 
children have obtained the age 10 years and are of 
sound mind, such children shall have the privilege of 
selecting the parent to which they will attach them-
selves. Such subsequent changes or new orders may be 
made by the court with respect to the disposal of the 
children or the distribution of property as shall be 
reasonable and proper. 
Since the 1969 amendment, the section has read, in part, 
as follows: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property and 
parties, and the maintanance of the parties and chi~d­
ren as may be equitable. The court shall have cont~nu­
ing jurisdiction to make such subsequent chan~es or 
new orders with respect to the support and ma~ntenance 
of the parties, the custody of th~ ch~ldr~n and their 
support and maintenance, or the d~str~but~on of the 
property as shall be reasonable and necessary * * * 
- 11 -
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The earlier statute said nothing about jurisdicti~ ~ 
modify orders for the support of the children or the partie 
but the court recognized that substantial changes in circ111• 
stances might warrant such modification. And in a recent 
case, the court seemed to recognize a broader power under 
the present statute than that found to exist under the prk 
statute. In Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974), 
the court said: 
We appreciate that all aspects of proceedings in divor 
matters are equitable; and that the court has "con tim 
ing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or m. 
orders with respect to the ... distribution of the~ 
perty as shall be reasonable and necessary"; and that 
this includes the power to take the property from one 
spouse and to award it to another where the interests 
justice so require. In making his determination the 
trial court may consider not only all the present 
circumstances of the parties, but what they may or ma 
not have done in the rearing and support of the child: 
The present statute, and the view of the court in 
Iverson, suggest that when proper circumstances are she~, 
a court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a divorce 
decree with respect to property, support, maintenance or 
custody, if the present circumstances establish the neces-
sity of such a change, without a showing of any substantio: 
change in circumstances. Certainly the legislature meant· 
do something by providing for "continuing jurisdiction", 
particularly in light of the interpretations of the for~e: 
statute. 
Be that as it may, the husband in this case is not 
- l2 -
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required to rely upon that statutory construction, because 
there was a substantial change in circumstances, or at least 
a change in what the court must have regarded the circum-
stances to be at the time the divorce decree was entered. 
In its earlier opinion in this case (R 140), the court 
recognized that modification might be based not only on what 
the facts were at the time of the original decree, but what 
the court took them to be, saying: 
The principal complaint made by the defendant is that 
the court imposed upon him a financial burden with 
which he was unable to comply, and that the plaintiff 
did not testify truthfully to his wealth and earnings 
at the time of hearing. If such be a fact, he is not 
helpless. He may petition the trial court for a mod-
ification of the terms of the decree, if there is a 
change in circumstances. While his actual earnings now 
may be the same as there were at the time of the di-
vorce, neither party can at this late day dispute the 
findings made by the court at the hearing. If plain-
tiff's earnings and wealth are now less than what the 
court found them to be, there is a change of circum-
stances which would justify a consideration by the 
court for the need to modify the original decree. 
Although the court had made no findings with respect to 
the value of the properties distributed to the parties, or 
the earnings of the husband, it is apparent that those matters 
were presented and presumably considered by the court at the 
time the original decree was entered; and in those instances 
in which a decree is based upon expressed or assumed facts, 
a showing that those facts are not presently true may just-
ify modification of the decree. 
Felt v. Felt, 27 utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972), arose 
- 13 -
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in a different way, but recognized the importance of assUJ;, 
or contemplated facts. The court said: 
* * * we affirm our previous pronouncements that a 
d~vorce decree containing awards for support basedon 
e1ther expressed or assumed facts contemplated by the 
parties or the court or both, should not be modified 
when the cornternplated facts are obvious or agreed tot 
the parties and in turn incorporated in the decree ir 
which the continuous jurisdiction of the court to ' · 
modify should not be used to thwart the expressed or 
obvious intentions of the parties and/or the court,--
unless such contemplated facts lead to manifest injus· 
tice or unconscionable inequity. 
In this case we are concerned with assumed facts and 
expressed facts which turned out not to be true. The fact' 
assumed by the court are shown in the transcript of August 
2, 197 4. The primary ones were that the husband was able'. 
make from $600 to $3,000 a month 1 that during the last fe·; 
months he had been making "anywhere from four to BOO a 
week," and that the equity in the horne was worth approxi-
rnately $30,000. 
At the hearing for modification of the decree 1 it was 
shown that the defendent' s income at that time was $190 pe: 
week or $823 per month, that his prior income had been su;· 
lernented by sales of capital assets, that he no longer hac 
assets to sell, that he was dependent upon income from his 
job in the produce company and gifts and support provided 
his father. It also showed that the equity in the home 
was substantially greater than the court was told. 
Grounds for modification having been shown, the trk 
- 14 -
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court should have looked at the total situation of the 
parties and should not have permitted continuation of a 
situation in which the husband was saddled with obligations 
which he will never be able to meet. 
In the past this court has not hesitated to overturn 
rulings of the trial court which have placed an impossible 
burden on a husband. 
In Hamilton v. Hamilton, 27 Utah 2d 206, 494 P.2d 287 
(1972), this court substituted its judgment for that of the 
trial court because a review of the record "led to a conclu-
sion that that decree places a burden upon the defendant 
that he will probably be unable to meet." 
In Martinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P.2d 821 
(1958), the court modified a judgment of the trial court which 
awarded two homes to the wife, and said: 
It seems to us that [the husband] is not entirely 
without justification in regarding the property award 
as so disproportionate to his desserts that it is a 
poor reward for his long years of~ffort in contri-
buting to its accumulation. He admits, however, that 
the income that he had should be sufficient for his 
needs if properly managed. 
With due deference to the conscientious efforts of the 
trial court to make a fair and equitable adjustment 
between these parties, which he accomplished in the 
main, we are nevertheless of the opinion that inasmuch 
as the parties own two homes, the defendant should have 
been awarded at least the one of the lesser value.* * * 
In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2 977 (1956), 
it was pointed out that 
-15-
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~he court's ~esponsib~lity is to endeavor to provi~. 
JUSt and equ~table adJustment of their economic re- · 
sources so that the parties can reconstruct their 1~ 
on a happy and useful basis. · 
Other courts have taken a similar view. In Bell v. ~ 
150 Colo. 174, 371 P.2d 773 (1962), the court recognized 
that where the property division made by the trial court is 
inequitable or unconscionable, or where there is an abuse o: 
discretion, the reviewing court will modify the action of 
the trial court. In Lopez v. Lopez, 148 Colo. 404, 366 P.l 
373 (1961), the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the 
divorce decree "should not result in an appropriation ofe 
entire estate of the husband, or in the impoverishment oft 
husband to the extent that he is unable to maintain himsel' 
as a working unit." 
Other cases recognizing that a divorce court shouMoc 
make an award that will impoverish the husband, or would 
leave him without money of his own, or lead to insolvency 
are Santilli v. Santilli, 169 Colo. 49, 453 P. 2d 606 (196~' 
and Rhodes v. Rhodes, 370 P.2d 902 (Alaska, 1962). 
The difficulties encountered by husbands who are Y~ 
dled with a decree too weighty for them to bear is well 
summarized in a concurring opinion by Justice Crockett in 
Wallis v. wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 342 P.2d 103, 106 (1959): 
* * * In many cases the circumstances [surrounding e 
granting of the divorce) require that the husband be 
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loaded with as heavy a burden as he can bear. Sometimes, 
through no fault of his own, circumstances become worse· 
th~ expense of going into court prevents him from seeki~g 
adJustment of the decree; and when he is cited for con-
tempt, an insuperable debt has accumulated. Different 
from other obligations, it cannot be discharged in 
bankruptcy. So he finds himself floundering in deep 
waters with such a weight around his neck that he will 
never be able to extricate himself. * * * 
* * * the purpose of the divorce decree and of the con-
duct of the parties under it must be calculated toward 
the solution of existing problems and the sustenance of 
the parties so they can reconstruct their lives on the 
most wholesome foundation possible under the circum-
stances. The purpose of the provisions for alimony and 
support money is to provide for the current needs, and 
not to allow the beneficiary to sit by and permit a 
burdensome debt to accumulate and then use it to harass 
the defendant so that he cannot hold a job or live a 
respectable existence. * * * 
In this case the trial court should have done something 
to relieve Dale Kessimakis of an unconscionable burden. 
Regardless of what the facts were at the time of the ori-
ginal divorce decree, at the time of the modification hearing 
they were substantially different from what the court had 
assumed them to be, based upon Betty's testimony. 
Dale's present position is that he has a judgment 
against him for $16,391.40, and is obligated to pay to the 
plaintiff for her support and the support of the two minor 
children still in her custody, the sum of $400 per month. 
Interest on the judgment amounts to approximately $106 per 
month, which brings the payments to in excess of $500 per 
month, just to stay even. If Dale were to pay additional 
sums to reduce the principal of the judgment, he would have 
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no funds left for himself, and would be dependent upon the 
charity of his father. 
The divorce court, sitting as a court of equity, has 
the power and flexibility to fashion a remedy. It may be 
true that it is too late to do anything about the property 
division, but it is not too late to do something about the 
alimony and support money in such a manner as to permit 
Dale to pay the past indebtedness. A reasonable and equit-
able remedy in this case would be to modify the decree to 
amortize the judgment so that is would be paid off in 3 1/l 
years, and suspend payment of alimony and support during U 
period, whereupon the court again could consider the needs 
and financial abilities of the parties. Such a decree wauL 
permit Dale to extricate himself from the burdensome debts 
that have been placed upon him and, at the same time, would 
give to plaintiff funds necessary for support and maintenar. 
of herself and the two children. 
II 
The court erred in adjudging appellant guilty of N~E 
The trial court not only refused to do anything to 
relieve this husband of the unconscionable burden that had 
been placed upon him, but found him in contempt of court a: 
sentenced him to 30 days in jail. 
The evidence established that the husband had made the 
1' mortgage payments in the amount of $350 between February 
- 18 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and August 1976, and that subsequently from August 1976 
until the date of trial, he had paid the sum of $350 per 
month to the wife. 
The court found that there had been no material change 
in Dale's income or earnings since the entry of the decree, 
"except to the extent that they have been self imposed." 
There was no finding of ability to pay or of willfulness in 
disabling himself from paying. Yet the court concluded that 
the defendant's acts, conduct and omissions had been contemptu-
ous. The findings do not support the conclusion. 
While some cases have talked about inability to preform 
being no excuse if he is unable to perform "as a result of 
his own action;" e.g., Brown v. Cook, 123 Utah 505, 260 P.2d 
544 (1953), the cases generally seem to require something 
more then the mere fact that the party put it out of his 
ability to perform. There must be some element of willful-
ness or deliberateness in order to support a judgment for 
contempt. Ex parte Gerber, 83 Utah 441, 29 P.2d 932, 933 
(1934); and Parish v. McConkie, 84 Utah 396, 35 P.2d 1001 
(1934). 
Ir. this case the defendant's inability might well have 
been caused by something he did himself, e.g., selling of 
breeding stock of quails and other capital assets in order 
to satisfy indebtedness, but such inability would still not 
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result from the willfulness or deliberateness necessary to 
support a judgment of contempt. The court here did not fir 
such willfulness, but only that he may have put it out of 
his ability to earn as much as he had earned previously. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court seemed to forget that it was sitting a 
a court of equity and was bent upon punishing Dale Kessirnai. 
for his inability to respond completely to the unconscionat 
burden that had been placed upon him in the original decr~ 
notwithstanding preponderating credible evidence that there 
had been a substantial change in circumstances from what tt 
court assumed the circumstances to be at the time of entry 
of the original decree. This being the case, the court 
should have exercised its equitable powers to grant some 
relief to this appellant. He cannot meet the payment schei. 
imposed upon him by the court unless he obtains help from 
friends and relatives. This being an equity case, this 
court may review questions of both law and fact. Article'· 
Section 9, Utah Constitution. The findings of the trial 
court are against the weight of the evidence insofar as 
they find that there has been no substantial change of 
circumstances. The equity in the home was substantially mo: 
then Betty Kessimakis said it was, and Dale Kessimakis' 
earnings were substantially less. These facts, taken to-
gether with the amount of his present earnings, compared 
- 20 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the burdens of the decree, required the trial court to 
grant relief. Since it did not do so, this court should. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Robert Ryberg 
RYBERG & HcCOY 
325 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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